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Abstract  
Indonesia Armed Forces (TNI) through war model becomes the frontline in dealing with terrorism in New Order 
era. Along with development the time, in Reformation Order today, TNI has two main functions of Military Operation for 
War (MOW) and a supporting force role in scope of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW has 14 points 
as a legal umbrella for the TNI in Carry out the  duties, including in dealing terrorist threats by TNI. After the policy to 
separate the police from TNI, there has been a paradigm shift from a war model to a criminal justice model by placing the 
police at the forefront. This creates a dilemma on the ground. This research uses qualitative methods and Miles and 
Huberman analysis technique. A phenomenological qualitative approach is done to get the conditions in field. The primary 
data was collected by interviews with state officials of the BIN, BNPT, TNI Commander, and the Staff related to role of TNI. 
The results show that TNI's involvement to combat terrorism lately must go through state political decisions that are 
formulated with indicators that are consistent with democratic principles. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The report of Tempo.co (2016) refer to BNPT data of January 2016 stated that 2.7 million Indonesians were 
involved in a series of terrorist attacks. This number did not include followers and sympathizers of terrorist networks whose 
number was estimated at 0.004 per cent or equivalent to 1000 people. It is not surprising that Indonesia become an important 
element for observers of world terrorism and radicalism (Mubarak, 2015: 78).  
The Global Terrorism Database notes that terrorism in Indonesia has existed since 1977 and increased in 1996. The 
highest number of terrorism was in 2000 and 2001, marked by a number of terrorism attacks cases: 101 cases and 105 cases, 
respectively. Meanwhile, the largest victims of terrorism were 781 people in 2002; among them, 246 people died and 535 
were injured. In following year, total number of victims was 482 people, with 46 people killed and 336 injured (Garnesia, 
2018). The targets and victims of terrorism also vary widely, both local and international community. For example, Bali 
Bombings I attacked many foreign citizens.  
There are four history phases of Indonesia's terrorism movement. The first phase was marked by establishment of 
DI/TII, pioneered by Imam Kartosuwiryo in 1950s. The second phase was in 1970-1980s with Komando Jihad group's terror 
movement, some of the important figures were former of DI/TII leaders. The third phase was terror and violence action 
within and post-reformation in mid-1990s until now. The fourth phase was the development of third phase, radical ideology 
in Islamic groups. This ideology's development was also encouraged and motivated by global phenomena, including the 
emergence of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 (Mubarak, 2015: 78). Consistent with above description, 
intensity of terrorism action in Indonesia has increased, especially within and post-reformation era. This phenomenon also 
coincides with a paradigm shift or transition to counter terrorism in Indonesia from authoritarianism to democracy and using 
a law enforcement approach to tackle terrorism from previous war model. 
Every country or regime generally has a different approach to respond the terrorism, divided into two approaches, 
war models and criminal justice systems (Mengko, 2017: 102). The first model considers terrorism as a threat to the state's 
defense and existence. The military forces have an important role to combat terrorism. On other hand, the second model 
considers terrorism as a law violation and the law enforcers and police become the forefront. The military force does not 
really involve in combating terrorism. Mengko stated that there is no country adopts the pure model. Many democratic 
countries use the second approach, but it is possible to involve the army. The difference was occurred in definition and 
conditions when the military can be involved to combat terrorism. 
Since the early days of Indonesian independence, several groups of terrorism and separatism have emerged, 
including DI/TII, Revolutionary Government of Republic of Indonesia (PRRI), People's Struggle for Universe (Permesta), 
and Ratu Adil Armed Forces (APRA). These movements had the spirit to establish a new country or at least separate 
themselves from Indonesia. These movements of terrorism and separatism were based on dissatisfaction with central 
government. The terrorism and separatism also had various backgrounds; DI/TII was based on Islamic ideology whose 
ideological traces can still be felt today. Meanwhile, PRRI and APRA based their movements on non-religious ideologies. 
The style of terrorism movement in Indonesia had changed during the New Order era. The religious sentiment-
based backgrounds had colored the terrorism movement in Indonesia. The most concern of terrorism action were the Woyla 
incident in 1981 and Borobudur Temple bombing on January 21 1985. Indonesia Armed Forces (TNI) was appointed as the 
spearhead to deal with terrorism in these two incidents. This reality was consistent with political system and centralized 
government system and the TNI placement becomes an important instrument to maintain the political stability and state 
security. It can be said firmly that state prioritizes the war model in dealing with terrorism. 
The fall of New Order in 1998 became the starting point of significant paradigm change in TNI role to counter 
terrorism. One important reform in security sector is the separation of POLRI from TNI with TAP MPR number 
VI/MPR/2000 on the separation of TNI and POLRI, and TAP MPR number VII/MPR/2000 on the role of TNI and POLRI. 
This separation put TNI as secondary instrument to counter terrorism in Indonesia. On other hand, Polri become the leading 
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force to counter terrorism. The involvement of TNI to deal with terrorism is stated in Law No. 34 of 2004 on the TNI to carry 
out Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), which also contains the obligation to overcome terrorism. 
 
2. RESEARCH METHOD 
This research was conducted by phenomenological qualitative approach. A phenomenological qualitative approach 
is done to get the conditions as they are (Moleong, 2014). Primary data sources were obtained through interviews with state 
officials BIN, BNPT, TNI Commander, and the Staff related to role of TNI in facing the terrorism actions. Secondary data 
sources were obtained through open sources and personal sources during interviews. The data analysis technique uses the 
data analysis model of Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2014), which starts with data collection, data condensation, data 
display, and verification/conclusion. The technique of testing the validity of data was done by triangulating the source. 
 
3. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
Reformation becomes the starting point of this research because the political events have changed the policy map, 
from a centralized and authoritarian government to become democracy. The changes in political system during the 
reformation are referred as revolution, not reformation, by many observers of terrorism. This fact is due to a series of 
amendments to the 1945 Constitution that have changed its political structure, including changes to the highest state power. 
For example, before the amendment, People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) had the authority to elect and appoint a 
president/vice president, but after the amendment, he became a high state institution (Article 3 of amended 1945 
Constitution). The president and vice president are directly elected by people. This amendment also affects the main duties 
and functions of TNI, especially in responding to internal security disturbances.  
 
The Role of TNI in Dealing with Terrorism at Beginning of Indonesian Independence 
Indonesia still had various unresolved problems in early days of independence. Some of them were unity, where at 
that time still has a real challenge. This condition was motivated by the existence of groups with different views and 
dissatisfied with the shape and direction of the new independent state. These groups show their disapproval in various ways, 
from rebellion, separatism, until terrorism. One example of this resistance movement was DI/TII that declared by 
Kartosuwiryo at West Java in 1949. This group was born and guerrilla as a rebellion movement against the Indonesian 
government (Minarva, 2017). This group carried a mission to make Indonesia a country based on Islamic teachings. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that DI/TII group could immediately spread to several provinces, including Central Java, Aceh, 
South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan. 
The widespread of DI/TII group became the most massive rebellion in Indonesia at that time. TNI played a central 
role to overcome the separatist movement by adopting various operational tactics that ended successfully. TNI did the 
Bharatayudha operation in West Java using the Betis Fence tactic to carry out an operation to suppress DI/TII. This tactic 
involved collaboration between the TNI and people to narrow the DI/TII rebellion space. This success was evidenced by the 
arrest of DI/TII top leader, Kartosuwiryo, on June 4, 1962. 
TNI formed a special force called the Banteng Raiders to defeat DI/TII in Central Java. These troops implement the 
State Fortress Movement Operation under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Sarbini, which ended up in leadership of 
Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Yani (Setyawan, 2016). Furthermore, to defeat DI/TII in South Sulawesi, TNI launched a military 
operation by sending troops from Siliwangi Division. This operation was quite difficult because Kahar Muzakar's troops 
controlled the field and the rebellion was defeated in July 1965. 
The DI/TII in Aceh was defeated by different way, not involving weapons. Colonel Yasin held the Aceh People's 
Harmony Conference on 17-21 December 1962. The results were; granting special regional status to Aceh and substantial 
autonomy rights from central government. This fact made the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh ended with a peace agreement 
(Setyawan, 2016). 
The DI/TII group's separatist movement was defeated successfully. However, the Indonesian nation's struggle to 
face the threat of terrorism did not stop. A new terrorism group called Komando Jihad (KomJi) was emerged in 1970s. Some 
main actors of Komando Jihad were former of Kartosuwiryo DI/TII, including Abdullah Sungkar, Aceng Kurnia, Haji Ismail 
Pranoto, Danu Muhammad Hasan, Dodo Muhammad Darda, Ateng Djaelani, Warman, and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. The 
Komando Jihad group starts the terror in Java and Sumatra (Mubarak, 2015: 81-82). The most phenomenal terror movement 
was the hijacking of Garuda Indonesia flight number 206. It travels from Soekarno-Hatta Airport to Polonia Airport, Medan, 
in 1981. 
This group hijacked and took hostage a Garuda DC-9 Woyla plane at Don Muang Airport, Thailand, after forcing 
the pilot to direct the plane to Colombo, Sri Lanka. The Indonesian intelligence said that the five hijackers were members of 
Komando Jihad. They were Sofyan Effendy, Wendy Mohammad Zein, Zulfikar T Djohan Mirza, Mulyono, and Mahrizal. 
The hijackers demanded the release of 80 Komando Jihad members who were jailed for carrying out acts of terror during 
1978-1980. In addition, hijackers also demanded a ransom of USD 1.5 million. Responding to this incident, Indonesian 
government launched a military operation by deploying the Sandi Yudha Forces Command (Kopassandha) led by Lieutenant 
Colonel Sintong Panjaitan (Fadilah, 2015). These troops managed to defeat hijacker that lasted 65 hours. The operation was 
success and well-known as Operation Woyla, popularizing the TNI and Kopassandha troops, which later became 
KOPASSUS.  
The TNI has vital role in dealing with terrorism in Indonesia during the New Order era; it cannot be separated from 
political situation at that time. Indonesia's analysts stated that New Order system was colored and even dominated by 
military, bureaucracy, and technocrats. The strong emphasis on political stability to pursue development inevitably pushed 
the New Order government to give a more significant role to the military, including to overcome the terrorism. However, it 
cannot be denied that New Order's authoritarianism has generated civil society antipathy, which led to the 1998 reform 




Countering Terrorism in Post-Reformation Indonesia: TNI in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) 
The reformation era in Indonesia was marked by the fall of authoritarianism. At same time, democracy becomes the 
basis of life of nation and state in Indonesia. Law enforcement and upholding human rights (HAM) are the community's 
demands and also affecting the patterns of terrorism dealing in Indonesia. At the beginning of independence until near 
reformation, TNI became the leading force to combat terrorism. This role starts to change today. The TNI Law, passed in 
2004, provides guidelines for main roles, functions, and duties of TNI. Article 5 of Law Number 34 of 2004 on the TNI 
stated that TNI is a state instrument in defense sector. Then, article 6 states that TNI is a means of defense functions : (1) to 
become forefront against any form of military threats and armed threats from outside and within country against territorial 
sovereignty and national safety; (2) to take action against every form of threat, and (3) to restore the state security condition 
which was disturbed due to security chaos. 
Article 7 contains the primary duties of TNI. It include the task to uphold the sovereignty of state, to maintain the 
territorial integrity of Republic of Indonesia and 1945 Constitution, and to protect the entire nation of Indonesian from the 
threats and disturbances of the country integrity. TNI does these main tasks with two methods: Military Operations for WAR 
(MOW) and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). 
MOW and MOOTW are a division of military roles based on their mission. MOOTW is a type of military 
operation outside the war context. Therefore, these operations are more aimed at maintaining world peace or preventing the 
war. In addition, the MOOTW operations can also take the form of natural disasters handling, humanity, and eradicating 
armed movements (Mengko, 2015: 177). 
Related to above description, MOOTW has 14 points, one of them is  to overcome terrorism and facilitating the 
Indonesian National Police (POLRI) to keep the security task and public order as regulated in the law. Careful observation 
shows, especially referring to Law no. 34 of 2004 concerning the TNI, even though not key actor, TNI still has the legitimacy 
to handle terrorism through MOOTW. However, in its implementation, especially MOOTW in dealing with terrorism, it still 
creates a lot of debate. 
The debate is based on two reasons. The first is related to the legality aspect, issuance of Perpu No.1/2002 
concerning "Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism," which later became Law No.15/2003 on the Eradication of Criminal 
Acts of Terrorism. The law states that terrorism is a criminal act that the handling process must be done by law enforcement 
officials, in this case, Police. In other words, involvement of TNI to tackle terrorism is considered problematic because the 
TNI is not part of law enforcement apparatus, such as the Police. The second is related to the socio-political aspect, which 
response to the spirit of Indonesian reform. This aspect has pushed the law enforcement agenda (pro-Justicia) in dealing with 
terrorism and abandoned the military approach. 
The two aspects mentioned above make the National Police legitimacy becomes the leading institution to tackle 
terrorism at this time. It can be seen clearly the shift in handling of terrorism, from a war model to a criminal justice model. 
Considering that law enforcement takes precedence over war, National Police has a greater mandate to tackle terrorism than 
the previous era. 
It is undeniable that by prioritizing criminal justice, police will actually bear a much heavier task burden, especially 
when viewed from terrorism movement, which in its operations is increasingly organized, has a wide network, and takes 
advantage of technological developments. For examples are the attack on Cirebon Police Headquarters in 2011 and attack on 
church in Solo in 2012. The two attacks are manifestations of terrorism action with a background of religious sentiment. This 
new pattern is characteristic of early extremist movements. 2000 (Putri, 2004: 133). 
Referring to previous condition of Bali Bombing I incident, which occurred on October 12 2002, prompted the 
Indonesian government to issue Perpu No.1/2002 on the Crime of Terrorism, which was later passed into Law No.15 / 2003 
on the Crime of Terrorism. Meanwhile, concept adopted by Perpu No. 15/2003 on Criminal Acts of Terrorism is consistent 
with definition of terrorism adopted by United Nations (UN); the terrorism action is defined as criminal acts. In other words, 
this definition defines terrorism limited to the activities done by non-government actors. 
The terrorism handling with a criminal justice approach is indeed more relevant today. This approach is more 
consistent with a democratic system that respects civil supremacy (Mengko, 2017; Haryono, 2010; and Wibisono, 2018). 
Moreover, this second approach also received more support from civil society than the first approach, which emphasized the 
“war” dimension in countering terrorism in Indonesia. 
The involvement and success of TNI to combat terrorism in one case can be seen from success of Tinombala 
Operations Task Force in hunting down Santoso and his men in Poso. The operation in 2016 succeeded in paralyzing the 
leader of East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT), Santoso, otherwise known as Abu Wardah. Santoso died after being involved in a 
firefight with TNI in mountainous region of Poso. The Tinombala Operations Task Force combines elements of National 
Police, in this case, Anti-terror Special Detachment 88 and TNI. The TNI's experience in fighting terrorism movements in 
mountainous and forest areas, such as when defeating the DI/TII group, made a positive contribution to the operation to 
suppress the Santoso group. 
The Head of Public Relations Division of Police, Inspector General Police Setyo Wasisto, said in one occasion that 
involvement of TNI to combat terrorism in Poso was very necessary. 
“We have seen Tinambola Operation in Poso, where it was 'beyond police capacity.' So, if it exceeds the capacity 
of police, TNI must play a role there. Who shot Santoso? It was the TNI who shot Santoso. So, there is no problem 
with TNI being involved." (Quoted from tribunews.com) 
Careful examination shows there were 18 (eighteen) acts of terror in several areas in 2018, including May 8, riots at 
Mobile Brigade Command Headquarters in Kelapa Dua, Depok, West Java; May 10, attack at Bahayanagkara Hospital 
Kelapa Dua, Depok, West Java; July 15, throwing of a pot bomb at Indramayu Police Headquarters, Cirebon, West Java; 
August 20, attacks members of Sat Sabhara Police, Cirebon City Police, West Java; August 24, shooting of members of PJR 
Toll Kanci-Pejagan, West Java. Subsequently, January 24, attack on Pasir Putih prison, Nusakambangan; February 11, attack 
on Lidwina Church, Sleman, D.I. Yogyakarta; being May 13, suicide bombings exploded in 3 churches in Surabaya, East 
Java; May 13, a bomb explosion at Wonocolo Flats, Sidoarjo District, East Java; May 14, a suicide bomb explosion at Police 
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Headquarters in Surabaya, East Java; July 5, an explosion at a house in Bangil, East Java; September 7, an explosion in 
Cemanis Hamlet, Sumenep, East Java; November 20, stone-throwing at Lamongan Marine Tourism Traffic Post, Lamongan 
District, East Java; (2018-2019 BNPT Report Infographics).  
In May 14, there was an attack on police members at Riau Police Headquarters; in May 22, attack the members of 
Maro Sebo Sectoral Police Office, Kab. Muaro Jambi, Jambi; and January 1, bombing of Bantoala Police, South Sulawesi; 
(2018-2019 BNPT Report Infographics). In 2019, there were also acts of terrorism in several provinces, including June 7, 
attacks on a member of Pam in Pandeglang Regency, Banten; October 10, there was an attack on TNI General (Purn) in 
Pandeglang Regency, Banten; May 25, persecution of residents in Sukabumi Regency, West Java; June 3, an explosion at 
Police Station in Kartasura area, Sukoharjo, Central Java; July 4, shooting of Traffic Monitor Post in Kulon Progo Regency, 
D.I. Yogyakarta; August 17, attack on Wonokromo Police Headquarters, Surabaya, East Java; March 12, there was an 
explosion at a house in Sibolga, North Sumatra; March 13, a suicide bombing in Sibolga, North Sumatra; November 13, a 
suicide bomb explosion at Medan Police, North Sumatra; December 18, attacks on members of Special Detachment 88 AT, 
in Tebo District, Jambi; August 26, attacks on members of Police in North Tarakan District, North Kalimantan; and June 22, 
and June 22, attacks in Kebun Torue Subdistrict, Central Sulawesi; (2018-2019 BNPT Report Infographics). 
The various terrorism incidents in 2018-2019 received direct responses from Bilveer Singh, Head of Center of 
Excellence for National Security (CENS) from Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in an interview with author 
on November 14, 2017. He stated that in current era, MOOTW is very important, especially because wars are rare. Moreover, 
currently, there are many domestic crises, and TNI is no longer always at forefront to solve them. According to him, public's 
view of TNI tends to continue to improve, so the TNI must always be ready to implement MOOTW, because the biggest 
threat currently is internal threats, including terrorism. He added, by looking at role of TNI to tackle terrorism from beginning 
of Indonesia's independence, TNI has been implementing MOOTW for a long time. 
 
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) of TNI Seen from a Defense Diplomacy Perspective 
The development of military tasks in democratic era creates a concept called Defense Diplomacy. Cottey and 
Forster (2004: 5-6) explained defense diplomacy as a role change of military. Previous military role was limited to traditional 
functions such as war, defense, deterrence, intervention and other aggressive forms. The concept of defense diplomacy today 
has emerged which includes the military role in peacetime cooperation. This role can be done through various activities, such 
as defense cooperation, military assistance, and peacekeeping operations. Even in another definition, Cottey and Forster 
emphasized the military role to support the democracy creation, good governance, human rights (HAM), conflict prevention, 
and enabling the state to overcome all forms of security problems itself (Cottey and Forster, 2004: 8). TNI’s MOOTW in 
defense diplomacy also has a broad spectrum and does not only talk about the aggressive use of force. 
Another definition of defense diplomacy also touches on involvement of defense diplomacy actors. K.A Muthana 
(2011: 1-2) said that defense diplomacy activities involve not only military actors or defense officials, but also include other 
institutions that can become supporters, including research institutes, academics, and universities. Furthermore, he added that 
defense diplomacy aims to achieve national interests in defense sector, both at domestic and abroad. It can be concluded that 
military role in current democratic era has become very broad. 
The close attention shows that TNI’s MOOTW and concept of defense diplomacy have the same essence, regarding 
the military role in democratic era. These two elements can help the community at large to view to change military role when 
the democratic climate in Indonesia develops. Society can begin to remove the negative stigma about the military and/or the 
use of military force in democratic times. Moreover, current defense and security challenges are very diverse and very 
dynamic. Therefore, it cannot be denied that involvement of all elements of state, including the TNI, is urgently needed, 
including in dealing with terrorism. 
Related to above explanation and borrowed K.A. Muthana statement, it is time for all elements of nation to sit back 
together to determine firmly, precisely and directed, a legal umbrella in what conditions and in what kind of conditions the 
TNI is fully involved to counter terrorism without violating the principles of good democracy today. 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
The terror action in past three years have no longer been aimed only at destroying public facilities, causing 
casualties and loss of life, but also the loss of sense of security in society by exploiting religious teachings for political 
purposes, which is one of distinctive forms of terrorism. Furthermore, political setting changes in Indonesia have also led to a 
shift in counter-terrorism paradigm which no longer emphasizes on the war model, but puts forward the criminal justice 
model to put the National Police to response it. 
Countering terrorism, reformation and implementation of democracy require a reduction in use of military force 
which is considered part of authoritarianism of New Order. However, this does not mean that TNI does not have a role to 
protect the nation's unity from threat of terrorism. 
TNI can still play an active role in MOOTW strategy, even though there are frequent polemics. Therefore, based on 
terrorism data in Indonesia, it is time for all elements of nation to sit down together to determine firmly, precisely and with 
direction the legal umbrella to determines when TNI is fully involved in dealing with terrorism. TNI has also adopted the 
concept of defense diplomacy which enables this institution not only to carry out traditional functions in form of war, 
defense, deterrence, intervention and other aggressive forms but also includes the military role in peacetime cooperation, 
including defense cooperation, military assistance, and peacekeeping operations. 
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